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THE STAKEHOLDER MOVEMENT AND THE SOCIAL 
RESPONSIBILITIES OF CORPORATIONS: 
A COMPARATIVE INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE 
by 
Roy J. Girasa* 
Richard J. Kraus** 
One program that played a central role in our 
[Chase Manhattan Bank's] cultural revolution 
was the Corporate Social Responsibility 
Program. Few companies in the 1970s made 
charitable contributions, and still fewer had 
programs whereby a panned percentage of 
annual earnings were contributed to 
charity .... My [David Rockefeller, CEO of 
Chase] rationale for an active corporate 
responsibility program was simple: Businesses 
could not afford to become isolated for the 
larger society of which they were an integral 
part .... Any business that does not respond 
creatively to this world and its growing 
insistence on an improved quality of life is 
cutting off its future nourishment. For, however, 
you interpret its role, the corporation depends on 
*Professor of Law, Lubin School of Business, Pace University, 
Pleasantville, New York. 
** Professor of Law and Program Chair, Department of Legal 
Studies and Taxation, Lubin School of Business, Pace 
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the health of its society. Just as society's 
perception of us molds the laws that govern us, 
society's health determines whether we will 
have a vigorous or slack marketplace .... 1 
INTRODUCTION 
The United States historically has been a nation 
committed to individualism. Freedom to think, act, and resolve 
difficulties without governmental interference continues to 
dominate the American ethos. The same laissez-faire attitude 
has been transplanted to the American public corporation. 
Nowhere in the world is it easier to set up a corporation? 
Corporations are creatures of the state. They are artificial 
entities that are created and operate within the state of 
incorporation and beyond its borders. Corporations throughout 
the world generally have one of two governance models, the 
"shareholder" model or the "stakeholder" model with 
variations within each of the models.3 Both types of entities 
vary somewhat from country to country. In this article, we will 
initially examine the major types of corporate entities prevalent 
in the business world among nations. Thereafter, we will 
examine the trend of the American "shareholder" model to 
incorporate and integrate the social responsibilities inherent in 
the "stakeholder" model in order to produce a corporate social 
responsibility ("CSR") model. 
"SHAREHOLDER" vs. "STAKEHOLDER" MODEL 
The Shareholder Model 
The classic formulation of the U.S. corporation, clearly 
described by Adolph A. Berle Jr. & Gardiner C. Means, 
indicates the relationship that exists between shareholders and 
managers.4 In essence, shareholders of public corporations play 
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no role in the management of the corporation but must delegate 
the role to managers who are in turn supervised by a board of 
directors elected by the shareholders. 
The U.S. and the U.K. exemplify the Anglo-American 
shareholder system which is defined by the emphasis upon 
shareholder value to the virtual exclusion of the other 
stakeholders: employees, customers, suppliers, and the public. 
Professor Milton Friedman argued that corporations owe a duty 
to maximize the profit of shareholders within the confines of 
legal and regulatory enactment and owe nothing to other 
stakeholders.5 Friedman's analysis is questioned by many 
scholars who posit a theory of legal and social responsibility 
that corporations arguably have to the state and other 
constituencies.6 
The U.S. shareholder model indicates that the 
shareholders ostensibly elect the board of directors and the 
board selects the managers who perform the day-to-day 
operations of the corporation. The distinguishing feature of the 
U.S. model is the large number of shareholders who are widely 
disbursed nationally as well as internationally. Shares of stock 
are not ordinarily concentrated in the hands of a limited 
number of investors but are owned by small and larger 
shareholders and, in recent years, increasingly by institutional 
investors. Under the stakeholder model, as discussed 
hereinafter, there are relatively few shareholders.7 Investors, 
under the U.S. model, are really passive investors due to the 
fact that they have too few shares and are too widely disbursed 
to act independently. This scenario, however, is changing with 
the increasing influence of institutional investors who are 
becoming more actively involved in the selection process. 
The board of directors ' main role is to monitor the 
management on behalf of the shareholders. The board, 
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however, often consists of managers who also are on the board. 
These same management board members select the board 
members who are to monitor the managers. The chief executive 
officer is often the chairperson of the board. The composition 
of the board may then cause the board to neglect its duties on 
behalf of the shareholders. Proxy contests may act as a check 
on management but the reality is that 99.6% of corporate 
boards are elected in uncontested proxy solicitations.8 CEO pay 
has risen to a staggering degree as high as 400 or more times 
9 . . . that of an employee's salary. Often, the dramatic mcrease m 
executive pay is due to the CEO' enormous influence over 
board members.10 
The chief officers of the corporation (CEO and CFO) 
are selected by the board. The major difficulty is that they are 
essentially insulated from the passive shareholders. This 
insulation has permitted officers, with impunity, to cut back on 
research and development, or to make investments to maximize 
the next quarter's earnings. The officers fail to maintain a 
"Chinese wal1"11 between analysts and investment banking 
operations. Managers lobby successfully to have states enact 
anti-takeover laws which have the effect of insulating poor 
managers. There have been numerous examples of the lack of 
ethical behavior on the part of managers that go beyond the 
Enron and related well publicized scandals.12 
The Stakeholder Model 
The stakeholder model reflects the model most utilized 
in the non-Anglo-Saxon major industrial nations. There are a 
variety of subsets of the model but its emphasis varies widely 
from that of the shareholder model. The stakeholder model 
emphasizes the social responsibilities to various stakeholders 
and to society itself. In one form, found previously in Japan, 
the key feature was corporate assurance of lifetime 
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employment for the employees of the corporation. Employees 
there had a greater incentive to develop and supply firm-
specific human capital, to practice significant loyalty to the 
firm, to facilitate team effort, and to be willing to make 
concessions in times of distress. Management's emphasis was 
on long-term health of the corporation, to benefit the 
employees and to return a profit to the shareholders. Since the 
primary holders of corporate indebtedness were banks, there 
was less need and incentive for immediate profit gains and, 
therefore, more for long term profitable outlook. Japanese 
corporate structure is one that is insular and conservative. It 
protects management from the external pressures of the market 
and from shareholders. Banks often dominate the board 
because corporate capital is raised from bank loans rather than 
from the public sale of securities. 
Japanese firms have been part of a keiretsu. Competing 
corporations thereby became united in protecting each other. 
Board members often consisted of a number of members from 
competing organizations. When one company had financial 
difficulties, it would be propped up by the competing 
companies or by the entering into "friendly" mergers. These 
companies should have been permitted to expire. The eventual 
collapse of the Japanese market left only companies with 
multinational entities and independently operated entities to 
survive. Japan enacted legislation in 2002 that permitted 
companies to adopt a U.S.-style method of corporate 
management. By March 31 , 2004, some 71 firms have so 
adopted these changes. 
Other styles of stakeholder models include those of 
Germany and, to some extent, those of France. The German 
securities market is essentially underdeveloped. Of two million 
companies in Germany, about 4.600 are stock companies. 
Some 825 of the 4,600 companies are truly publicly traded. 
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The result is that there are rare unfriendly takeovers. The few 
German shareholders consist mainly of holders of large blocks 
of shares with long-term interests. Shares are also owned by 
large financial institutions which provide funding for the 
corporations. 13 These shareholders control the actions of the 
corporate managers. 
The German corporation is a classic stakeholder model. 
It consists of two corporate boards, namely, the supervisory 
board and the management board. The supervisory board 
(Aufsichtsrat) contains a minimum of three members with 
multiples of three but no more than 21 members. In firms of 
over 2,000 employees, the shareholders may elect half of the 
board and the employees the other half of the board members. 
German supervisory boards must have a minimum of one-third 
employee membership on the board. The board's primary duty 
is to appoint and remove members of the management board 
(Vorstand). The Vorstand is responsible for the day-to-day 
operations of the corporation. It is not subject to the dictates 
from the general meeting of shareholders. Rather, shareholder 
demands are to be made to the supervisory board which then 
makes adjustments and demands upon the management board. 
The management board must take into consideration the 
various stakeholders including the shareholders, the welfare of 
the employees, and the community at large. The profit motive 
is not the paramount principle governing the corporation's 
. 14 operations. 
Members of the management board are prohibited from 
engaging into any transaction which competes with the 
corporation except with permission of the supervisory board. 
The management board 's duties include the providing of 
information to the supervisory board with respect to the 
corporation's business, condition, policy, and other factors 
impacting upon the corporation. Management is subject to the 
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strict control and influence by banks which often own large 
blocks of shares. Such ownership is prohibited in the United 
States under the Glass-Steagall Act of 1933. 15 
The principal advantage of the German model is 
management accountability. The banks demand significant 
control over management. 16 Both the management and the 
board seek the firm's long-term health and profitability. Banks 
receive added information to better react to technology-driven 
and rapidly changing markets. They, therefore, add their 
expertise to the decisonrnaking process. The cost of capital 
acquisition is less because as banks are more amenable to grant 
new loans or restructure existing loan agreements. Lower 
dividend payout ratios result because of money retained for 
conservative research and development for factory 
improvements, equipment, and employee training. It appears 
that the German system is less efficient and flexible than the 
United States system. Companies are not subject to diverse 
shareholder input. Businesses are not vulnerable to takeovers; 
inefficient firms, therefore, continue their poor performance. 
Significant bank influence tends to cause management to invest 
in safe operations and impede investments in new ventures that 
may have significant risk. 
The disadvantages of the German and Japanese 
stakeholder models are considerable. Corporations following 
the models now are rethinking their effectiveness in the 
emerging global marketplace. Due to conservative banking 
financing, there is an inherent bias against startups, ground-
breaking research and development, and human-capital 
industries By way of comparison, the average age for a listed 
firm on the New York Stock Exchange in the U.S. is 14 years; 
the average for a company on the German stock exchange is 55 
years. In the U.S., 40% ofthe listed firms are less than 10 years 
old but in Japan it is .7%. There is a tendency towards 
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overinvestment in capacity, excessive risk avoidance, and 
insufficient attention to the creation of shareholder wealth. 
There is less creativity, initiative and adaptiveness. The cost of 
attending to constituencies other than shareholders is illustrated 
by the fact that the 1996 cost of labor in the U.S. was $17.75 
per hour as contrasted with $32 in Germany and $21 in Japan. 
Also, legal standards with respect to disclosure of information 
to shareholders tend to vary greatly in the U.S. and U.K. 
17 models as opposed to that of Japan and Germany. 
In France, the Paris capital market is the fourth largest 
in the world. Stock holdings tend to be concentrated. The 
French Stock Exchange, institutional investors, companies, 
foreign investors, and friendly shareholders (30-50% of shares) 
hold most of the shares. Similar to Germany, French banks 
dominate shareholders with much power over boards and 
corporate policies. Bank controls prevent many hostile 
takeovers. Non-bank shareholders do have rights under French 
law. A shareholder possessing 5% or more of the corporation' s 
capital, for example, may request the appointment of a 
management expert by a judicial court whose report is given to 
the shareholders and to the Commission des Operations de 
Bourse. Shareholders are required to appoint an auditor whose 
role is to control the financial statements of the corporation and 
assess the legality of the corporation's operations. French 
corporations are stakeholder entities accountable to a variety of 
stakeholders beyond that of the shareholders. 18 
In 2001, the French Assembly passed a law which 
required annual social and environmental impact reports from 
businesses. The law requires premier marche19 corporations to 
issue the reports based on designated social indicators 
encompassing human resources, community, and labor 
standards. In addition, mandatory reporting is required 
concerning the implementation of management systems for 
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health, safety, and the environment including consumption of 
energy, water and raw materials, and other requirements? 0 
A Possible Third Way- The Convergence Hypothesis 
Many scandals have arisen from corporate malfeasance 
within the U.K. and the U.S. Scholarly research and reports by 
a number of corporate and government committees in the U.K., 
have suggested a third way of evaluating corporate decisions.21 
The Anglo-Saxon shareholder model must recognize the need 
to take into account the effects of corporate decisions upon 
other stakeholders.22 This convergence process towards a 
common set of principles and objectives aims as analyzing the 
standards of each of the systems in order to discover a best 
standard.23 Initiatives for the convergence of the two basic 
theories of corporate governance include the Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act of 2002; the New York Stock Exchange Report of the 
Corporate Accountability and Listing Standards and its Rules 
of 2003; the 2003 Higgs Review of the role and effectiveness 
direction and the Smith Report of Audit Committees in the 
United Kingdom; the 2002 German Code on Corporate 
Governance; the 2002 law on reforming the Japanese corporate 
governance system; and the 2002 consultative document of the 
High Level of Company Law Experts in the European Union.24 
The convergence theory finds a common bond between 
the shareholder and stakeholder models.25 The focus has 
shifted to one of "enlightened shareholder value" that requires 
companies and shareholder components to recognize and report 
the effects of business decisions on extended stakeholder 
constituencies including employees, suppliers, communities, 
and the environment. A problem, however, arises: the U.S. and 
U.K. systems rely essentially on legal enforcement for the 
protection of shareholders; German, French, and Japanese 
corporate governance systems rely upon concentrated equity 
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ownership rather than the law to curb undesirable managerial 
conduct.26 
CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY (CSR) 
Capitalism has advocated the creation of wealth, 
opportunity, and technological advances. Nevertheless, 
capitalism has been accompanied by a lack of concern for the 
many persons involved in the accumulation process. 
Shareholder vs. stakeholder concerns had tipped the scales in 
favor of the former due to the immense success of the U.S. 
system. But Enron27 and other scandals left constituencies 
paying for the errant ways of corporate management. The 
corporation is now looked upon as an entity capable of not only 
doing good for shareholders but also capable of creating harm 
to diverse persons, especially to workers who directly 
participated in wealth creation. Thus, the movement towards 
corporate social responsibility has emerged.28 
CSR has caused managers to look beyond short-term 
corporate profits to longer term goals of sustainable 
development, equitable employment practices, and long-term 
social and environmental well-being. The failure to heed such 
concerns may cause companies to sustain significant and 
catastrophic losses. U.S. automakers' near total lack of concern 
for environmentally helpful fuel efficient automobiles, for 
example, has greatly affected profitability. 
U.S. Governmental Responses to Corporate Lack of Social 
Responsibility 
The failure of corporations to attend to responsibilities, 
other than the making of profit for shareholders, has caused the 
creation of federal and state agencies to address the problems 
attendant to wealth creation. The Occupational Safety and 
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Health Administration (OSHA) was created to address the 
problem of employee injuries due to the lack of safe working 
conditions; the Consumer Product Safety Commission assures 
that products manufactured in the U.S. and in foreign countries 
meet safety standards to prevent caused untold numbers of 
injuries to consumers; and the Environmental Protection 
Agency was created to address the pollution and harm to the 
environment by careless corporate entities such as General 
Electric whose decisions spoiled the Hudson River.29 
The Emergence of Suggested U.S. Multinational Corporate 
Codes of Conduct 
In the U.S., codes of conduct have been in existence for 
several decades. The Rev. Leon H. Sullivan, for example, who 
was a member of the Board of Trustees of General Motors 
Corporation, proposed six basic principles for dealing with the 
apartheid policies of the Union of South African regime. 
Among the principles included are the prohibition of racial 
segregation in eating, comfort, and work facilities, and the 
increase of non-whites in managerial and supervisory 
positions.30 
The earlier Sullivan Code of the 1980s led to the 
evolving of a more general code of conduct known as the 
Global Sullivan Principles of Social Responsibility. The Code 
enunciated principles by which multinational corporations 
pledged to: (1) respect the employees ' freedom of association; 
(2) compensate employees so as to enable them to meet at least 
their basic needs; (3) provide a healthy workplace 
environment; ( 4) protect human health and the environment; 
and (5) promote sustainable development. Numerous 
multinational corporations have signed onto the Code. They 
did so in part to forestall governmental rulemaking in this 
arena.31 
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Selected International Codes of Corporate Social 
Responsibility 
International codes of conduct are inherently voluntary 
and concern employee, environmental, or human rights issues. 
They are designed to make corporations more accountable to 
those persons directly or indirectly affected by their 
production. The difficulty has been that such codes are most 
often ignored in developing countries due both to their desire to 
encourage corporate investment and as a result of bribery of 
governmental officials by foreign business entities.32 
Voluntary Governance: 
The needs of impoverished nations for capital 
investment and employment have caused them to permit 
multinational corporations to own and manage large segments 
of industries critical to the needs of the inhabitants. The 
problems affecting these nations include extensive poverty, 
poor working conditions, child labor, lack of employee 
protection, and low environmental standards. Multinationals 
have threatened to go elsewhere unless these nations permit 
them to exploit their natural and human resources. Major 
companies, such as Nike, looked the other way in the 
exploitation of employees until they were called to task with 
highly unfavorable publicity. Codes of conduct for 
corporations operating in both undeveloped and developed 
countries appeared. The codes, for the most part, have been 
voluntary and lacked enforcement absent adverse publicity. 
They varied and were either general in nature or specific to a 
particular industry. They were in accordance with suggested 
international norms or were based on the laws and regulations 
of the particular nation or subdivision thereof. The codes could 
be formulated by nations, international organizations, with or 
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without the input of various stakeholder groups such as 
religious, environmental, labor, and others. 
Compliance with the codes by corporations both aided 
them and impeded their planning and goals. Negative aspects 
of the codes include added costs, higher wages, furnishing of 
better working conditions, lessening pollution emanating from 
their plants, and changing their internal policies and those of 
the managers with respect to adherence to the codes. Benefits 
include worker satisfaction and elimination or lessening the 
possibilities of strikes and other related actions, lack of adverse 
publicity, possible lower insurance premiums, a more 
productive workforce, avoidance of consumer boycotts, and 
better relations with local and state governments.33 
Institutional Governance: 
An emerging trend that has significant potential 
influence over corporate governance is the growth of the 
institutional investor. There has been an unprecedented 
expansion of power being exercised by such investors. Pension 
funds, mutual funds, and insurance companies, and asset 
management firms have a total equity of well over a trillion 
dollars.34 Their emergence has been assisted by cross-border 
equity flows, technological innovation, and financing needs of 
European Union and other countries. The investors demand 
that their funds, consisting in large part of retirement savings, 
be invested in companies that are well managed. These 
institutional investors bring a great deal of capital to their 
investments. They also have the capability of overseeing the 
governance of corporations and the use of tools necessary for 
proper governance maintenance.35 Accordingly, organizational 
and governmental proposed codes of conduct have proliferated. 
These codes and principles include the ones stated hereinafter. 
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The U.N. Code ofConductfor Transnational Corporations: 
The draft contains four parts: (1) The activities of 
multinational corporations must comply with local laws and 
traditions, respect human rights, avoid corruption, disclose 
information, and be in accord with economic, financial, and 
social rules; (2) The treatment of multinational corporations 
requires host states to protect these entities; (3) 
Intergovernmental cooperation fosters exchange of information 
and consultations; and ( 4) The implementation of the Code 
requires dissemination of the Code to the affected nations and 
report to the U.N. Commission on Transnational 
Corporations. 36 
The 1977 fLO Tripartite Declaration of Principles: 
The International Labor Organization (ILO) 1s 
composed of employers, employees, and government. Its 
Declaration of Principles aims to guide multinational 
corporations and other stakeholders to develop policies aimed 
at social process. Multinationals are called upon to promote 
equal opportunity, security, and collective bargaining in 
employment as well as the preclusion of arbitrary dismissal, 
strike-breaking, and other unfair labor practices. Multinationals 
are compelled to obey local laws and regulations and to respect 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, the ILO's 
Constitution, and other ILO conventions. It serves, however, as 
a voluntary guide for appropriate multinational behavior. 
Unless corporations and nations act in accordance with the 
Declaration of Principles, there are no effective mechanisms 
for effective enforcement thereof. 37 
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The 2003 U.N. Sub-Commission on Human Rights Code on 
Transnational Corporations: 
The Code is concerned with the rights and obligations 
of both governments and transnational corporations. It requires 
multinationals to adopt rules of operation to comply with, 
report on implementation, and incorporate the Code into their 
contracts with suppliers, distributees, licensees, and other 
actors. Transnational corporations are to be subject to 
transparent and independent monitoring and verification by the 
U.N. and other international and national agencies. The Code 
requires states to create the legal framework necessary for 
implementation of the Code. The Code sets for six types of 
rights or obligations of multinationals: (I) the right to equal 
opportunity and non-discriminatory treatment; (2) the right to 
security of persons; (3) the rights of workers including rights 
against forced or child labor, remuneration that ensures an 
adequate standards of living, and collective bargaining; ( 4) 
respect for national sovereignty, e.g., refraining from bribing 
public officials, and human rights, e.g., food and drinking 
water; ( 5) consumer protection; and ( 6) environmental 
protection, including compliance with national and 
international laws. The Code is voluntary in nature, without 
enforceable mechanisms.38 
The OECD Guidelines for Multinational Corporations: 
The 1976 declaration on international investment and 
multinational enterprises by the Council ofMinisters ofthe 33-
member Organization of Cooperation and Development 
(OECD) as amended in 2000 consists of standards of good 
conduct for all multinational corporations operating in or from 
OECD nations. The Code prescribes conduct concerning 
taxation, financing, and information disclosure. The Code has a 
section of employment and industrial relations which prohibits 
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discrimination in employment and promotion of personnel, 
respect of the right of employees to be represented by trade 
unions, and other worker protections. The section on 
environmental protection provides that multinational 
enterprises (MNEs) must avoid creating environmentally-
related health problems and must respect the human rights of 
those affected by their activities consistent with the host 
government's international obligations and commitments; 
MNEs are to apply principles of corporate conduct compatible 
with the guidelines with respect to business partners, suppliers, 
subcontractors, and other third parties with whom they deal; 
parties must eliminate child labor and forced labor. They must 
improve environmental management and provide a 
contingency plan respecting environmental impacts. They also 
must incorporate disclosure and transparency by encouraging 
social and environmental accountability. Additional sections 
b . 39 seek to com at corruptiOn. 
As with other codes of institutional governance, the 
OECD Code is not legally mandatory on the OECD countries 
but rather is a political commitment to foster corporate 
conduct. Disputes, however, are referable to the OECD's 
Committee on Investment and Multinational Enterprises. 
Committee recommendations have caused pressure on MNEs 
for compliance particularly due to the numerous complaints 
that have been filed with the said Committee. 
The 1999 UN Global Compact: 
The Global Compact seeks to promote good corporate 
governance in human rights, labor, and the environment. It 
draws upon the Sullivan Principles, the Universal Declaration 
on Human Rights, the ILO 1998 Fundamental Principles on 
Rights at Work, and the Rio Declaration on Environment and 
Development. It invites MNEs to join governmental efforts, 
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international organizations, and non-governmental organization 
(NGOs) to advance social and economic development. The 
Global Compact principles state that businesses should: 
support and respect the protection of internationally proclaimed 
human rights within their spheres of influence; make sure they 
are not complicit in human rights abuses; uphold freedom of 
association and forbid compulsory labor; eliminate racial and 
gender discrimination in employment and occupation; support 
a precautionary approach to environmental challenges; 
undertake initiatives to promote greater environmental 
responsibility; encourage the development and diffusion of 
environmentally friendly technologies, and work against all 
forms of corruption, including extortion and bribery. 
Companies adhering to these principles are to send a 
letter from the CEO to the Secretary-General agreeing to abide 
by the principles and to change their culture in day-to-day 
operations and public communications. A company's annual 
report must describe the ways it is supporting the Global 
Compact. Progress is reported on a U.N. site. A number of 
companies have agreed to adhere to the Compact including 
British Petroleum, Daimler-Chrysler, DuPont, Shell, and 
others. The lack of enforcement and monitoring of compliance 
raises concerns about the Compact's effectiveness.40 
In 2004, the United Nations Global Compact issued a 
report, "Who Cares Wins: Connecting Financial Markets to a 
Changing World," which examined the social, environmental, 
and governance issues that can have a material impact on 
corporate governance performance.41 There appears to be 
convergence at the values level. There is an emerging paradigm 
of governance that perceives CSR and corporate governance to 
have a unified interest at the values level. It is imperative that 
governance have an ethical component. CSR examines the kind 
of product and service the company produces, how it is 
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produced, and the social and environmental impacts of 
production. It includes corporate philosophy governing 
medium and long-term actions, and renegotiation of corporate 
responsibility. 
International Organization for Standardization (ISO): 
The ISO is a nongovernmental organization, based in Geneva, 
which is affiliated with national standards institutes located in 
146 nation-states. The institutes are either part of a 
governmental structure or are compelled by governments. The 
organization has focused on voluntary international standards 
for many products and for activities in producing goods and 
services. It has developed some 12,000 standards to insure that 
products or services conform thereto. Its environmental 
management system was established in 1996 and is called the 
ISO 14,000 Series. The ISO environmental management 
system requires a company to establish and make publicly 
available an environmental policy suitable to its size and 
environmental impact. The system seeks to identify impacts 
and the management processes to reduce them. In particular, 
the system seeks to ascertain a process by which pollution 
emissions are scientifically reduced and efficiency improved.
42 
Companies must comply with local laws and make a 
commitment to prevent pollution. They are to adopt procedures 
to assess and document the environmental impact of their 
operations; employees are to be trained in these procedures. 
There are no specific standards set forth but rather a 
management systems approach is to be used. There are 
provisions for internal and external audits of the process. 
By December 2003, over 66,000 ISO 14,000 
management system registrations have been completed 
worldwide. The lack of specific standards and the failure to call 
upon companies to adhere to treaties concerning ozone 
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depletion, biological diversity, or hazardous wastes continue to 
plague the system. There is no requirement that the corporation 
actually release its report on adverse environmental effects nor 
is there a requirement for an external audit. The International 
Standards Organization plans to institute a proposed ISO 
26,000 which would set forth social responsibility guidelines 
for customer assurance of ethical standards being practiced.43 
World Bank and IMF Reports: 
The World Bank and the International Monetary Fund 
prepare Reports on the Observance of Standards and Codes 
(ROSC) in order to aid countries in strengthening their 
corporate governance frameworks. Reports of some 35 
countries have been prepared which incorporate OECD 
corporate governance principles and their observance by the 
affected countries. Included in substantial detail are the 
assessment, description, and policy recommendations of the 
rights of shareholders, the equitable treatment of shareholders, 
the role of stakeholders in corporate governance, disclosure 
and transparency, and Board responsibility.44 
Codes focused on Specific Industries: 
Industries, including the oil and the extractive and 
energy sectors, have been criticized for their alleged lack of 
environmental and social concerns. In December 2000, the 
Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights was 
promulgated. Companies must ensure respect for human rights 
and fundamental freedoms as well as maintain the safety and 
security of their operations. Companies are to assess a series of 
risk factors based on credible information from a range of 
perspectives, including civil society groups knowledgeable 
about local conditions. Companies are to use their influence 
with public security so as to not to use the services of 
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individuals credibly implicated in human rights abuses; use 
force unless strictly necessary and to an extent proportionate to 
the threat; and violate the rights of individuals when they are 
exercising the rights of freedom association and peaceful 
assembly, or other related rights; Companies must follow 
similar procedures with respect to private security providers.45 
Governance Practices Demonstrating CSR Principles 
There are generally acceptable requirements for 
corporate governance systems wishing to adhere to CSR 
principles. These requirements include the following: 
Disclosure, accountability, and transparency: 
Companies need meaningful disclosure of the social, 
environmental, and ethical issues so that they can go beyond 
window-dressing. Issues of risk management and strategic 
advantages are to be specified. Companies must review the 
progress of CSR integration and examine whether internal 
control systems cover CSR. Incentive compensation is to given 
be for addressing CSR objectives. The board's CSR operations 
and status of the company's stakeholder's relationships are to 
be transparent. The company is to develop policies covering 
CSR issues and report on policy implementation. 
Board composition and diversity: 
A corporation is to move away from cronyism and 
towards the recruitment of independent directors with diverse 
skills, knowledge, backgrounds, and expertise. The board of 
directors shall include directors with non-traditional 
backgrounds who can add fresh perspectives. Diverse genders 
and ethnicity are to be a goal for companies. 
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Risk management oversight: 
A key board duty is the consideration of long-term 
corporate risks. A critical issue is the directors' competencies. 
Their active efforts to take a broad view of things that affect 
intangible assets and their ability to assess strategies critical for 
effective governance and corporate performance are to be a 
priority. 
Compensation of board, executives, and staff: 
Incentives are to be given to encourage CSR 
performance and for a holistic approach to risk and opportunity 
management. There is a need to examine corporate policies 
from a long-term perspective. 
Global Reporting initiative identification of cross-over 
indicators: 
Directors are to be independent and possess expertise 
for corporate performance. Board-level processes are to be 
instituted for overseeing the identification and management of 
economic, environmental, and social risks and opportunities. 
Also, a linkage between executive compensation and the 
achievement of financial and non-financial goals is to be set 
forth. 
Need for CSR alignment and embedment: 
CSR is to be embedded throughout the organization so 
as to assure a company's CSR performance. Once embedded, 
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CSR will affect corporate strategy so as to lead a company 
towards investments in less harmful alternatives, e.g., in 
matters of environmental concern. Risk management, diversity, 
disclosure, and compensation are to be enablers of CSR 
46 performance. 
Regional and Local Statutory Enactments of CSR 
There has been pressure placed upon Japanese and 
European governments to incorporate U.S.-style principles of 
corporate governance. The Enron and other U.S. corporate 
scandals, however, have made them reluctant to bring about 
dramatic changes. The E.U. and its 25 member states have 
recommended or mandated the identification and disclosure of 
social and environmental risks. The E.U., France, Belgium, 
Germany, and the U.K. have enacted regional and local 
legislation requiring pension funds to disclose the extent to 
which they take ethical, social, and environmental information 
into account in constructing their portfolios.47 
Denmark, the Netherlands, Norway, and Sweden 
require companies to provide expanded environmental 
information in their annual reports. France, in its "New 
Economic Regulations" (Nouvelles Regulations Economique), 
requires companies to have a "triple-bottom-line" reporting of 
all companies trading on the French stock exchange (the 
Bourse de Paris). Companies must disclose very detailed 
social48 and economic information, including environmental, 
labor, community involvement, health and safety information, 
in their annual reports to shareholders.49 
The E. U. has initiated a number of internal and external 
plans concerning CSR. The internal European Employment 
Strategy, E.U.-Ecolables, and the Eco-Management and Audit 
Scheme (EMAS) are all designed to promote CSR. The E.U.-
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Ecolables voluntary initiative encourages the production of 
more environmentally friendly goods and services and ensures 
transparency to consumers. EMAS was created in order to 
promote "continuous improvements in the environmental 
performance of industrial activities by committing firms to 
evaluate and improve their own performance." Externally, the 
Cotonou Agreement with African, Caribbean, and Pacific 
nations seeks to promote human rights norms. The Agreement 
"incorporated defining human rights as a fundamental element 
of the agreement which serves as the basis for dialogue with a 
third country government on human rights." It imposes 
obligations upon states rather than on the corporate entities 
themselves. 50 
The "Communication on the E.U. role in promoting 
human rights and democratization in third countries" 
liberalizes trade under the E. U. 's Generalized Systems of 
Preference with countries complying with the E.U.'s minimum 
social and environmental standards. 51 It seeks to ensure 
compliance by providing sanctions in the form of preference 
withdrawal when countries commit serious and systematic 
violations of International Labor Organization core labor 
standards. 52 The E.U. 's Manifesto of Enterprises against Social 
Exclusion led to the creation of the European Business 
Network in 1995. The Manifesto advocated an open dialogue 
between the relevant actors and the exchange of best practice 
on CSR. In the E.U.'s Lisbon Summit of the European Council, 
CSR was made a major priority within the framework of 
sustainable development. 53 
The Goteburg Summit of June, 200 1, was concerned 
with the role of companies within society and within the 
context of sustainable development strategy for Europe. It led 
to the publication of a "Green Paper on Corporate Social 
Responsibility" that sought to stimulate debate on the subject. 
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The Green Paper undertook to determine the role of the E.U. in 
the development of CSR, the role of CSR in corporate business 
strategies, the role of other stakeholders, the monitoring and 
evaluation of CSR strategies, and the mechanisms appropriate 
for developing CSR. It rejected the "one-size-fits-all" approach 
and reflected the desire to have companies self-regulate. 54 
The E.U.'s forays into CSR have had some modest 
success. It has harmonized financial disclosure and recognition 
of contractual obligations. Social and environmental 
responsibilities of corporations are emphasized. Its "Lisbon 
Strategy" of March 2000 has provided for social and 
governmental disclosure obligations including environmental 
concerns. The E. U. Commission issued a Recommendation 55 
concerning the recognition, measurement, and disclosure of 
environmental issues in annual reports and financial accounts. 
The Recommendation divides the environmental issues into 39 
very specific categories that are to be considered. The purpose 
of the information is to convey informational data to regulatory 
authorities, investors, financial analysts, and the public 
concerning the potential environmental risks and liabilities that 
56 may face a company. 
The 2003 Communication on Corporate Governance is 
prefaced by the comment that "well managed companies, with 
strong corporate governance records and sensitive social and 
environmental performance, outperforms their competitors." 
The E. U. Commission recognizes that the need to integrate the 
capital markets with an enhancement of the quality of fmancial 
reporting, the development of industrial policies to achieve 
sustainable economic development, and the examination of 
social responsibility. In its Communication for Sustainable 
Development, the E.U. invited companies with 500 or more 
employees to publish a triple bottom-line report to shareholders 
evaluating their performance against specified economic, 
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environmental, and social criteria. The 2003 Modernization 
Directive that followed the Communication amended prior 
directives incorporating International Accounting Standards 
into E.U. companies' financial reporting.57 Thus, commencing 
in 2005, companies are required to include a fair review in their 
financial reports of the development and performance of the 
company's business together with principal risks and 
uncertainties that they face. Companies are also to include 
financial and other nonfinancial key factors including 
environmental and employee matters. 58 
The U.S. , mandates substantial reporting requirements 
especially after Sarbanes-Oxley. The country, nevertheless, has 
very limited requirements concerning the disclosure of 
nonfinancial information due mainly to the failure of the U.S. 
government to have policies favoring sustainable development. 
Statutory requirements are most often based on individual state 
laws which vary considerably from state to state. Other than 
operating for any lawful purpose, there are few obligations 
concerning stakeholders other than shareholders' compliance 
with local statutes and regulations especially affecting 
employees. Sarbanes-Oxley has only tangentially affected 
corporations with respect to CSR but is concerned mainly with 
reporting financial results accurately and with the reduction of 
conflicts of interest. 
The few regulations concerning corporate 
environmental obligations include the requirement that a public 
reporting company disclose environmental information under 
Regulations S-K of federal securities law, namely the costs of 
complying with new environmental regulations at any 
governmental level. Companies are required to disclose 
pending environmental litigation wherever the litigation is 
brought by a government agency. Possible penalties for 
noncompliance are fines of $100,000 or more. Companies are 
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also required to disclose their financial and operational results 
and to disclose any known "events, trends, or contingencies" 
that might have a material impact in the future. 
The obligations include the disclosure of social or 
environmental information especially in industries that are 
extractive in nature especially in unstable countries or where 
their production might make the companies liable under the 
Superfund legislation. The perceived difficulty with the said 
Regulations is the near total lack of enforcement by the current 
Administration but companies should nevertheless comply with 
the Regulations should the position of the present 
Administration change or when there has been a change in 
leadership. Other U.S. requirements in this post-Enron era 
include the requirement that mutual funds and registered 
investment advisers disclose the policies and procedures they 
use to determine how to vote proxies for portfolio securities 
and how they actually voted. 
CONCLUSION 
The question remains whether social responsibility is 
compatible with economic success. It is clear that the U.S. 
economy leads the world in competitiveness. Nevertheless, it 
has had less than enviable success in the area of corporate 
social responsibility. Japan, on the other hand, together with 
France and Germany, have attended to the corporate social 
responsibility requirements but have lagged substantially 
behind the U.S. in economic success. Japan, for example, has 
until recently maintained lifetime employment for employees 
while the U.S. has promulgated an employment-at-will position 
that has displaced many thousands of employees in ensuing 
layoffs when companies faced economic crises. U.S. 
companies are permitted to go bankrupt or undergo 
reorganization. Japanese, French and German companies in the 
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past were supported by bank investors and became 
conservative and stagnant in business practices. The financial 
success of the U.S. companies appears to favor the shareholder 
model over the stakeholder model and even to favor 
shareholder concerns in any possible third convergence model. 
U.S. companies have become enormously powerful while the 
Japanese and even French and German companies and their 
bank investors have undergone many periods of crisis. 
Japanese executives, in fact, are now restudying U.S. corporate 
governance methodologies, thereby reversing U.S. companies' 
attempts to emulate the successes of Japanese companies two 
decades ago. 
It seems that economic success is the mam 
consideration in determining the extent of corporate social 
responsibility. Many problems arise, however, when 
individuals, institutions and nation states do not insist, in some 
enforceable way, that local and transnational companies attend 
to many global concerns: consumer and employee rights, the 
environment, global warming, terrorism and warfare59. The 
unity of peoples brought about by transportation, 
communication and the media have focused global awareness: 
companies must attend to obligations other than making 
immediate profits. 
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